War power of Congress and revision of the war powers resolution by Firmage, Edwin B.
The War Power of Congress and Revision of the 
War Powers Resolution*
Edwin B. Firmage**
I . I n t r o d u c t i o n
The United States Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution to 
restore its constitutionally mandated control over the war- making 
process. By forcing the President to seek congressional approval for 
military activity in volatile situations, Congress hoped to avoid the 
abuse of the war power by the executive branch that led to the Viet­
nam War. However, the War Powers Resolution is deeply flawed. It 
functionally delegates congressional war power to the President for at 
least sixty days. This is wrong for two reasons. First, if the President 
commences hostilities and concludes them within the sixty day win­
dow, it is unlikely that Congress will challenge the presidential initia­
tive. The President in such a situation will have been delegated the 
war power given by the Constitution solely to Congress. This consti­
tutes an unconstitutional delegation of the power to decide for war to 
the President, absent the necessity of self-defense in the face of an 
attack on this country. Second, once American troops are committed 
to combat, it becomes difficult—often practically impossible—for 
Congress to oppose the President and extricate American forces. 
Both scenarios have occurred repeatedly, and despite a recent cooling 
of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, presiden­
tial abuse of the war power threatens to continue.
Despite popular opinion, the recently concluded Gulf War was not 
a demonstration of how well the congressional war power worked.1 
While it is true that Congress voted to authorize the use of force on 
January 12, 1991,2 the events leading up to the congressional authori-
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1 See Glennon, The Gulf War and the Constitution, F o re ig n  A ff., Spring 1991, a t 84.
2 Confrontation in the Gulf; Text of Congressional Resolution on Use of Force in the P er­
sian Gulf, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1991, § A, a t 11, col. 1. “Congress grants President Bush the
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zation once again demonstrate presidential disregard for the terms of 
the War Power Resolution.3 Even as President Bush sought Con­
gress’ approval on January 8, 1991, he continued to maintain that he 
had authority to act without legislative authorization.4 In fact, the 
War Powers Resolution should have been invoked on August 7, 1990, 
when the U.S. announced its commitment to defend Saudi Arabia if 
attacked by Iraq.8 Later, when the U.S. announced it would double 
its troop deployment on November 8, 1990, the need for congres­
sional authorization became even more apparent.6 However, Congress 
could not muster support to challenge the President.7 When Congress 
finally voted to authorize the use of force, over 400,000 troops had 
been deployed and withdrawing any troops would question American 
credibility around the globe. Therefore, to protect American credibil­
ity, Congress was compelled to vote for war. If the Resolution author­
izing use of force is to have any meaning, it must be invoked and 
debated when the President commits U.S. forces.
Thus, the events leading up to the Gulf War demonstrate once 
again that the War Powers Resolution must be revised. Even though 
the War Powers Resolution has many flaws, it still represents this 
nation’s best chance to restore a degree of constitutional restraint 
over executive warmaking if it can be made to function effectively. 
This Article examines the evolution of the War Powers Resolution 
and its flaws, and proposes some modifications to make it work more 
effectively. Part II of this Article will provide a brief historical back­
ground explaining the congressional power to make war as it is con­
tained in the United States Constitution. Part III will review the ero­
sion of the congressional war power during the second half of this
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authority to wage war against Iraq. Senate approves resolution 52-47, with 45 Democrats and 2 
Republicans voting no. House votes 250 to 183, with 179 Democrats, one Republican and one 
Independent opposing.” Chronology o f War, The Washington Times, March 1, 1991, § B, at B4.
3 See Chronology o f War, The Washington Times, March 1, 1991, § B, at B4; Mathews, War 
In  The Gulf; The Road To The War, N ew sw eek , Jan. 28, 1991, at 54.
4 See  Gorey & Voorst, On the  Fence; The P resident says he  can lake America to war w ith ­
out asking Congress. The lawmakers disagree— but most would rather not ta ke  a public  stand  
at all, T im e, Jan. 14, 1991, at 12.
0 Dawson, U.S. Congressional Leaders Rack M ilitary  A ction  Against Iraq, Reuters, Aug. 7, 
1990 (AM Cycle) (“Bush Tuesday escalated the U.S. response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait by 
ordering thousands of troops and combat aircrafts to Saudi Arabia”); Chronology o f War, The 
Washington Times, March 1, 1991, § B, at B4.
8 Broder, M ove W idens Range of U.S. Offensive Options;
Stra tegy: I t's  Also A n  A cknow ledgem ent T ha t Iraq's Forces Cannot
Be D efeated  B y  A ir Power A lone, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 9, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 4.
7 Gorey & Voorst, On th e  Fence; T he  P resident says he can take America to war w ithout
asking Congress. The lawm akers disagree -- but most would ra ther not take  a public  s ta n d  at 
all, T im e , Jan. 14, 1991, at 12.
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century. Part IV will examine the executive branch’s use of covert 
warfare in the past to sidestep constitutional limitations on the Pres­
ident’s power to make war. Part V will discuss the enactment of the 
War Powers Resolution as an attempt by Congress to restore its con­
stitutional controls over the war power. Part VI will focus on 
problems with the Resolution as demonstrated by its inability to curb 
executive war making in the last decade. In part VII, I will suggest 
some revisions that are needed to make the Resolution an effective 
check on presidential abuse. Finally, this Article concludes that only 
a revised War Powers Resolution that requires action by both the 
executive branch and Congress can effectively ensure the establish­
ment of a “new world order” based on peace and mutual trust.
II. T h e  W a r  P o w e r 8
The Constitution of the United States confers on Congress the 
power “ [t]o declare War” and to “grant Letters of Marque and Re­
prisal.”9 Historical research indicates that the original intent of the 
Framers of the Constitution was to vest in the Congress the complete 
power to decide on war or peace, with the sole exception that the 
President could respond to sudden attack on the United States with­
out congressional authorization.10
Statements and writings by the founding fathers support this posi­
tion with absolute clarity. During the Constitutional Convention, de­
bates in the Committee on Detail centered around an original draft 
of the war power, which provided that “ [t]he Legislature of the 
United States shall have the . . . power . . .  to make War.”11 One 
member of the Committee, Charles Pinckney, opposed giving this 
power to Congress, claiming that congressional action would be too 
slow.12 Another member, Pierce Butler, said that “he was voting for 
vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite 
qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support
8 Portions of this argument are taken from F. W o rm u th  & E. F irm ag e , T o  C h a in  t h e  D og o f  
W ar: T h e  W a r  P o w e r  o f  C o n g re s s  in H is to r y  a n d  Law  (2d ed. 1989); The Reynolds Lecture, 
Address by Edwin B. Firmage, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah (Oct. 15, 1987) (Reyn­
olds Lecture); Firmage, Rogue P residents & the  W ar Power o f Congress, 11 G eo. M a so n  L. 
Rev. 79 (1988) (presented before the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law & 
National Security, Conference on Separation of Powers (Mar. 30, 1988)); Firmage, Covert War 
and the  Democratic S ta te: A n  E ssay on E nds and M eans, 15 P r e s e n t  T e n se  55 (1988).
The term “war power” as used here refers to the power to initiate war in American constitu­
tional law. See  W o rm u th  & F irm a g e , supra, at vii.
’ U.S. C o n s t, art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
10 F. W o rm u th  & E. F irm a g e , supra  note 8, at 22-31.
11 2 M. F a r r a n d ,  T h e  R e c o rd s  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  C o n v e n tio n  o f  1787 167-68 (1911).
12 Id . at 318.
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it.” 13 Butler’s motion received no second, and Butler himself later 
abandoned this view.14
Instead, James Madison and Elbridge Gerry, unsatisfied with the 
Committee’s proposal that the legislature be given the sole “power to 
make war,” moved to substitute the term declare for the term make, 
“leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.”15 The 
passage of this motion by a vote of seven states to two, made it clear 
that Congress would have the power to initiate war, and the power to 
repel sudden attacks on the United States would be reserved for the 
President.16 This view is further substantiated by Thomas Jefferson’s 
insightful statement in 1789 in which he said: “We have already 
given . . . one effectual check to the dog of war by transferring the 
power of letting him loose, from the executive to the legislative body, 
from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.”17
The power given Congress to “declare War and grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal”18 entails the power to decide for war declared 
or undeclared, whether fought with regular public forces or by pri­
vateers under governmental mandate. While letters of marque and 
reprisal originally covered specific acts,19 by the eighteenth century 
letters of marque and reprisal referred to sovereign use of private, 
and sometimes public, forces to injure another state. It was within 
this context that the Framers of the Constitution vested Congress 
with the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal.20 Clearly, only 
Congress has the constitutional power to wage war whether by pri­
vate parties or by the United States armed forces.
III. T h e  E r o s io n  o f  C o n s t it u t io n a l  W a r  P o w e r
A growing sense of globalism and the increasing international 
power of the United States made enforcing constitutional constraints 
against reckless war making more difficult during the twentieth cen­




18 See id. at 313, 318; F. W o rm u th  & E. F irm a g e  supra  note 8, at 18. Whether the vote was 
actually seven to two, or eight to one is unclear from the records of the Federal Convention. See  
M. F a r r a n d ,  supra  note 11, at 313-14, 318.
17 XV T. J e f f e r s o n ,  T h e  P a p e r s  o f  T h o m a s J e f f e r s o n  397 (J. Boyd ed. 1978), quoted in  F. 
W o rm u th  & E. F irm ag e , supra  note 8, at 179.
18 U.S. C o n s t, art. I, § 8, cl 11.
19 U.S. C o n s t, art I, § 8, cl. 11.
"  Lobel, Covert W ar and Congressional A u thority: H idden W ar and Forgotten Power, 134 
U. Pa. L. R ev. 1035 (1986).
21 See  F. W o rm u th  & E. F irm ag e , supra  note 8, at 180.
thinkers began to advocate a change in the balance of the war powers 
away from congressional control and toward vesting more power in 
the President.22 Any doubts about a change in the separation of the 
war power were ended by the development and use of atomic weap­
ons initiated with the dropping of “Fat Man” and “Little Boy.” Full- 
scale war was no longer a viable policy tool as some had envisioned.23 
The development of mass destruction weapons and sophisticated de­
livery systems, combined with the growing economic and defensive 
interdependence of nations worldwide, made war an unacceptable al­
ternative to diplomacy.
The development of nuclear weapons and the increasing interna­
tional interdependence of nations, unfortunately, did not lead to an 
era of world peace. The rise of Communism in Europe was perceived 
as threatening to swallow the world including the United States. 
American policy makers, in an effort to control what they perceived 
as a global security risk, began looking at the entire free world as 
“American soil” for the purposes of national security.24
The U.S. Government reflected this change in perspective in rather 
Orwellian fashion by renaming the Department of War the Depart­
ment of Defense and by creating the National Security Council 
(NSC). The executive branch’s growing sense of fear was epitomized 
by NSC Paper 68, which, by forecasting the global situation as an 
“indefinite period of tension and danger,”25 in effect, created a psy­
chological state of war. Consequently, the fear of being attacked by a 
“diabolically aggressive” opponent has become a driving force of war 
in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, Nicaragua, Libya, Panama, 
and the Persian Gulf States.26 Few of these small, far flung places 
ever posed a real military threat to the United States, yet, in each 
instance, the executive branch perceived that “defensive” military ac­
tion was required and chose to respond with military engagements.
Another result of our fearful perceptions was the dangerous erosion 
of the constitutional restraints on war making. During the Korean 
War, the executive branch began usurping congressional war power 
by invoking the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Constitution.
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22 Lobel, Em ergency Power and the  Decline o f Liberalism , 98 Y a le  L.J. 1385, 1398-99 (1989) 
(citing W. Wilson, C onstitu tional G overnm ent in  the  U nited  S ta te s  59 (1908)).
23 C. C la u s e w itz , On W a r  86-89 (M. Howard & P. Paret trans. 1976).
24 See  Lobel, supra  note 22 at 1399-1407.
25 Id . at 1400-01 (quoting S. A m brose , R ise  t o  G lo b a lism  190 (1971)).
26 See  White, Psychology and  A lterna tive  Security: N eeds, Perceptions, and M ispercep­
tions, in A l t e r n a t i v e  S e c u r i ty :  L iv ing  W i th o u t  N u c le a r  D e te r r e n c e  180-81 (B. Weston ed. 
1990).
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With the development of a nuclear first strike capability by the So­
viet Union, the power of the Commander-in-Chief clause reached its 
zenith. Senator Barry Goldwater argued that the President required 
the ability to launch a first strike when necessary to defend our na­
tion from nuclear attack.27 However, such a position would render 
the War Clause of the Constitution ineffectual because the President 
would then have the power to authorize any  use of military force by 
making a determination as to what is “necessary,” and what consti­
tutes a “defense.”
Despite the obvious constitutional dangers of giving the President 
such broad discretion to make war, advocates of an Executive war 
power have been successful in gaining support for their position by 
relying on the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Constitution. They 
claim the Commander-in-Chief clause draws its power from historical 
precedent and assert that throughout U.S. history the executive 
branch initiated acts of war without congressional authorization.28 To 
support this view, the State Department compiled an official list of 
137 instances where it asserted that the President, as the Com­
mander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, committed acts of war on his 
own authority beyond the borders of the United States.29
A close examination of the listed examples, however, discredit the 
State Department’s conclusion. Eight of the acts involved enforce­
ment of the law against piracy, for which no congressional authoriza­
tion is required. Sixty-nine of the acts, many of which were statuto­
rily authorized, were landings to protect American citizens. Twenty 
of the acts which, although illegal, were not acts of war so long as the 
United States claimed the territory, concerned invasions of foreign or 
disputed territories. Six of the acts were minatory demonstrations 
without combat; another six involved protracted occupation of vari­
ous Caribbean states, which occupations were authorized by treaty. 
At least one of the acts was an act of naval self-defense, which is 
justified under both international and national law.30 Even in the one 
or two dozen instances where the President has acted without con­
11 See  Goldwater, T he P residen ts' C onstitu tional Prim acy in  Foreign R elations and N a ­
tional Defense, 13 Va. J. Int. L. 463, 473 (1973).
28 See  Monaghan, Presidentia l W ar-M aking, 50 B.U.L. Rev. 19, 23-27 (1970).
28 F. W o rm u th  & E. F irm ag e , supra  no te  8, a t  144-46 (c iting  D ep’t  o f  S t a t e  H i s to r i c a l  
S tu d ie s  Div„ A rm ed  A c tio n s  T a k e n  by t h e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  W i th o u t  a D e c la r a t i o n  o f  W ar. 
1789-1967 (1967)); S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te  Ja m e s  Baker an d  D efense S ec re ta ry  C heney  in te s tim o n y  
before C ongress on Ja n u a ry  10, 1991 n o ted  th a t  a rm ed  force has been  used  m ore th a n  200 
tim es, an d  th a t  w ar h ad  been dec la red  on ly  five tim es. See  137 C ong. R ec. S130-S135 (daily  ed. 
J a n . 10, 1991).
30 See  F. W o rm u th  & E. F irm ag e , supra  n o te  8, a t  144-51.
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gressional authorization, he has done so by relying, however correctly 
or incorrectly, on either a statute, a treaty, or international law, and 
never on his power as Commander-in-Chief or as the chief 
executive.31
Thus, by invoking the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Constitu­
tion and by citing a list of debatable instances where the President 
committed acts of war on his own authority beyond the borders of 
the United States, the executive branch has slowly eaten away at 
Congress’ power to control when the country goes to war. In fact, 
neither the Constitution nor historical precedent empower the Presi­
dent to initiate a state of war or engage in an act of war on his own 
authority beyond the borders of the United States. The Commander- 
in-Chief clause was framed by a Constitutional Convention that un­
derstood “Commander-in-Chief” to mean Congress’ general.32 Textu­
ally, the presidential war-making power is strictly limited to defend­
ing against sudden attack33 and its empowerment in the late 
twentieth century represents a dramatic shift in constitutional war 
making power.
IV. C o v e r t  W a r  M a k in g  b y  t h e  P r e s id e n t
The development of covert warfare has been one of the adverse 
effects of the nuclear era. Since drawing a nuclear opponent into 
open war presented unacceptable consequences, both the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. employed other means to carry out their policies. Both 
states turned to covert military action as one method of achieving its 
policy goals. Since the dawn of the nuclear era, this nation has con­
ducted full-scale war; initiated coups; mined harbors; encouraged po­
litical assassinations; aided insurrection and sabotage; trained, 
equipped, and set loose brigands and terrorists; and responded to ter­
rorist acts against our citizens by Executive approved reprisals.34 All 
of these activities were carried out under Presidential directive, in 
violation of the Constitution, in disregard of the laws and preroga­
tives of Congress, and in open defiance of international law and mo­
rality. Both the scope and the notoriety of these activities conducted 
by the Executive has changed the meaning of covert war from “secret 
war” to “formally unacknowledged war.”35
31 Id . at 151.
32 Id. at 107-112.
33 Id. at 133-51.
34 See  F. W o rm u th . & E. F irm a g e , To C h a in  t h e  D og  o f  W ar: T h e  W a r  P o w e r  H is to r y  
a n d  L aw  253-69 (2d ed. 1989).
35 See  S. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 131 (1977) (defining covert action as clandestine
Covert war by the Executive is not clearly authorized by any con­
gressional statute.36 The National Security Act of 1947,37 usually re­
lied on by Presidents as justification for their illegal acts, makes no 
mention of covert action or paramilitary operations.38 While the 1947 
Act provides for gathering and analyzing intelligence, it also autho­
rizes the CIA to perform only “such other functions and duties re­
lated to intelligence affecting the national security as the National 
Security Council may from time to time direct.”39 On its face, this 
phrase does not authorize paramilitary action, and most certainly 
does not authorize covert actions unrelated to the acquisition of 
intelligence.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for 1981,40 on its face seems to 
authorize the president to engage in limited paramilitary operations 
without congressional control.41 However, except in extraordinary cir­
cumstances, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
must give prior notice to the Senate and House Select Committees on 
Intelligence when engaging in covert operations or significant intelli­
gence operations abroad, including CIA covert operations.42 The pres­
ident need not give prior notice in extraordinary circumstances but 
must make a subsequent report to the leadership of each committee 
and explain why prior notice was not given.43 Furthermore, the Act 
should be read as a supplement to constitutional and preexisting
244 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 17
activity designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations or persons in such a 
way that the involvement of the United States government is not apparent). Today, covert 
operations cover a wide range of activities in foreign countries including political advice to 
foreign persons or organizations, financial support and assistance to foreign political parties, 
covert propaganda, and the direction of paramilitary operations designed to overthrow or sup­
port a foreign regime. Lobel, Covert W ar and Congressional A u thority: H idden W ar and For­
g o tten  Power, 134 U. Pa. L. R ev. 1035, 1049 (1986).
36 B ut see  Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-193, § 103, 103 
Stat. 1701 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (1990)) (may permit the executive to 
conduct covert operations without congressional approval). The Hughes-Ryan Amendment was 
the predecessor of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1990, clearly authorized certain covert 
operations. 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (a) (1990); see also infra  notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
37 Pub. L. No. 80-253, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 5, 10, and 50 U.S.C.) (established the CIA, and was seen as authorizing cover action).
-1® See  S. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 476-92 (1977) (discussing whether the 1947 
statute authorized the CIA to conduct covert action).
39 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(5) (1990).
40 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (1990).
41 See  50 U.S.C. § 413(a)-(b) (1990).
42 See  50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (1990).
43 See  id. (the committees must be kept “fully and currently informed of all intelligence 
activities which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf 
of . . . the United States”); Covert War, supra  note 20, at 1094-96.
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statutory limits on the executive use of covert operations.44 The stat­
ute clearly states that it applies only “to the extent consistent with 
all applicable authorities and duties, including those conferred by the 
Constitution upon the executive and legislative branches of the Gov­
ernment.”45 If the Act is read as a congressional delegation authoriz­
ing the President to initiate covert paramilitary operations, it is an 
unconstitutional delegation of congressional power.46 The Constitu­
tion, on its face, vests in Congress alone the power to declare war.47
Nonetheless, the United States Government carries out various 
types of covert activity, including: intelligence gathering, indirect ma­
nipulation, and military intervention. Intelligence gathering and in­
terpretation of intelligence is clearly within the presidential power 
under the authorizing statute of Congress.48 Some of this activity will 
occur by covert means, and short of war, violence, or violation of in­
ternational law or congressional act, this activity is within presiden­
tial power. Second, and more troubling conceptually, is covert action 
beyond intelligence-gathering but short of war, acts of war, or vio­
lence and illegality prohibited by statutes of Congress and interna­
tional law. These are indirect acts of manipulation against another 
nation’s media, electoral and governmental processes, or economy. If 
these act are deemed “important to the national security of the 
United States,” they may arguably be within the President’s author­
ized power.49
The last category, military intervention, is unequivocally within 
the war power of Congress and includes military aspects of covert 
war, reprisals, and other acts of violence. These acts usually share 
one or both of two criteria: (1) violence at such a level as to be forbid - 
den by domestic and international law; and (2) direct intervention in 
another state designed to affect that state’s sovereign autonomy.50 
Therefore, such activity is prohibited from presidential undertaking
44 Lobel, supra  note 35, at 1094-95.
45 50 U.S.C. § 413(a) (1990).
46 H ig h sm ith , Policing E xecu tive  A dventurism : Congressional Oversight o f M ilita ry  and  
P aram ilitary  Operations, 19 H a rv . J. L egis. 327 (1982).
" Id.\ see Lobel, supra  note 35, at 1096.
48 The CIA may expend no funds for operations abroad beyond pure intelligence gathering 
unless the president finds such an operation to be important to the national security of the 
United States. 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1990).
48 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1990).
For example, in 1984 Nicaragua filed the action against the United States before the Inter­
national Court of Justice which addressed questions of the legality under international law of 
private forces trained, organized, financed, or supplied by one state to attack another. See  Con­
cerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. I l l  (Merits).
without congressional authority under Congress’ constitutional power 
to “grant letters of marque and reprisal.”51 Even with congressional 
authorization, a large part of such activity is prohibited by interna­
tional law.52 Where a paramilitary action violates international law 
by using force against a foreign state, it falls within the Congress’ 
exclusive control under the clause giving only Congress authority to 
grant letters of marque and reprisal.53
Conclusions can be drawn and lessons learned from the United 
States’ experience with covert action since World War II. First, is an 
observation about the tension between a democratic society and cov­
ert operations. Decisions made openly in public debate provide the 
foundation of a democratic state.54 The rationale for public debate is 
particularly compelling when questions of war and peace are at is­
sue.55 Consensus, so vital in the establishment and the conduct of 
foreign policy, can hardly occur when the executive branch deliber­
ately keeps Congress ignorant of its covert activities. Covert action 
precludes debate and takes power away from the people.
Admittedly, open and public debate of paramilitary actions is in
246 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 17
51 See Lobel, supra note 35, at 1059-1069.
52 See Military and Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. Merits 14, 111 (June 27). In Nicaragua v. U.S., the World Court listed certain activities 
tha t constitute violations of international law and stated:
(1) mere monetary aid to insurgents will not normally be considered an unlawful use 
of force under either standard, but will at most be considered unlawful intervention;
(2) arming and training guerrillas will meet the third standard of the unlawful use of 
force against another country; and (3) the provision of arms or logistical or other 
support to guerrillas, standing alone, does not meet the second and highest standard 
of aggression involving an armed attack on another country. W hat remains unclear is 
what acts of a state will meet the United Nation standard of aggression involving an 
armed attack. T hat standard prohibits both the sending out and substantial partici­
pation in activities of armed bands activities against another state. While correctly 
finding against the United States claim that Nicaragua’s provision of arms to El Sal­
vador rebels constituted an armed attack, the court did not address Nicaragua’s claim 
that the United States was “substantially participating” in the activities of the con- 
tras. The court instead rested its finding on the United States “participation” in acts 
of force involving the provision of arms and training. The court did find that the 
“contra force has, a t least at one period, been so dependent on the United States that 
it could not conduct its crucial or most significant military or paramilitary activities 
without the multi-faceted support of the United States,” a finding the court termed 
“fundamental in the present case.” Id. a t 111.
Lobel, supra note 35, at 1057.
83 T he  F ed era list  N o . 44, at 318 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see Lobel, supra  note 35, 
at 1055-1058.
84 Lobel, supra note 35, at 1078-1085.
“  “The Framers gave the power to declare war and to issue letters of marque and reprisal to 
Congress to ensure tha t hostilities using private or public forces would not be initiated without 
public debate.” Lobel, supra note 35, a t 1078.
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fundamental conflict with the perceived need for secrecy when covert 
actions are taken. Proponents of strong presidential leadership in for­
eign policy must distinguish between covert action kept secret from 
an opponent and covert action kept secret from Congress.58 The first 
form of secrecy is a legitimate exercise of security power, the second 
form is nothing less than a repudiation of democracy.57 Moreover, the 
Framers’ purpose in giving Congress the authority to decide whether 
to use force was to ensure that hostilities would not be initiated with­
out public debate. James Madison stated that, when American inter­
ests require the use of armed force, such hostilities should be under­
taken “ ‘not in an underhand and illicit way, but in a way consistent 
with the laws of war and becoming our national character.’ ”58 Cur­
rently, Congress plays almost no role, with “notification” at best go­
ing to a select few in Congress.58 Even unilateral action by the Execu­
tive runs the risk of breakdown between the White House and the 
Departments of State and Defense. This danger was realized during 
the Iran-Contra affair where Executive control over the operations of 
clandestine activity went directly from the NSC to the CIA, exclud­
ing or ignoring the advice of Cabinet officers at State and Defense. 
The obvious risks of open communication are preferable to the cor­
ruption of our government that is inevitable in covert warfare.
The United States’ record of covert war and acts of war is one of 
short-term embarrassment and long-term disaster. Any advantage 
that is achieved through military actions are overwhelmed by the vio­
lence done to other countries and to the United States. No system of 
congressional oversight realistically can meet this challenge. If acts of 
violence and war are contemplated, the country should debate the 
options in the open. The obvious risks of open communication are to 
be preferred over the inevitable corruption of the ideals and safe­
guards which accompany secret, covert warfare.
56 See  generally  D. H o ffm an , G o v e rn m e n ta l  S e c re c y  a n d  t h e  F o u n d in g  F a th e r s :  A S tu d y  
in  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o n t r o l s  (1981).
67 See  128 C ong. R ec. H9158 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Bonoir stating that 
executive initiation of covert war “commit[s] us to a specific foreign policy that has never been 
openly defended and supported, and whose outcome cannot be guided by our own democratic 
institutions.”); see also Lobel, supra  note 35, at 1097 (citing Shou ld  the  U.S. Fight Secret 
Wars?, H a r p e r ’s  M a g az in e , Sept. 1984, at 37. (remarks of Morton Halperin stating that covert 
action commits the United States to warfare without public debate)).
58 R o b e r ts o n ,  F ra n c is c o  D e M ira n d a  a n d  t h e  R e v o lu t io n iz in g  o f  S p an ish  A m erica , H  R. 
Doc. No. 1282, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1909) (quoting James Madison).
“  The director of the CIA is required to give the Senate and House Select Committees on 
Intelligence prior notice of significant intelligence operations abroad. 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) 
(1990).
V. T h e  W a r  P o w e r s  R e s o l u t io n
The War Powers Resolution60 was enacted as a result of the Ameri­
can experience in the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War was initiated 
as one more exercise in the policy to “contain” communism. The 
United States became increasingly involved in the ending of colonial 
rule in Southeast Asia, and in 1964 the Congress passed The Joint 
Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security in Southeast Asia (“Gulf of Tonkin Resolution”) authorizing 
the President, as he determined, “to take all necessary steps, includ­
ing the use of armed force” to assist South Vietnam or other South­
east Asian allies requesting our assistance.61 The United States’ in­
volvement in Vietnam steadily increased until full scale war was 
being waged. Eventually, in 1971 the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was 
repealed calling into question the President’s authority to conduct 
the war. After grappling with the consequences of the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution, and to avoid similar hasty and ambiguous delegations of 
the war power in the future, Congress enacted the War Powers 
Resolution.62
Congress’ first statutory attempt to return to a constitutional 
model of war power was the National Commitments Resolution of 
1969,63 which stated that the use of armed forces in foreign lands 
required approval by both houses of Congress through “treaty, stat­
ute, or concurrent resolution.” The Senate Foreign Relations Com­
mittee stated that the National Commitments Resolution was a re­
sponse to the “passing of war power from Congress to the Executive 
[that had occurred] after WWII” and that the resolution amounted 
to a “restoration of constitutional balance.”64
However, the Nixon Administration ignored the National Commit­
ments Resolution, and in 1970 and 1971 the President expanded mili­
tary activity into Laos and Cambodia without any approval from 
Congress.68 Congress responded by drafting a more powerful resolu-
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60 The War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended 
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988)).
61 H.R. J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Stat. 384 (1964). The Resolution provided that 
“the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President. . .  to take all neces­
sary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent 
further aggression.” Id.
65 See  Ely, The Am erican W ar in Indochina, Part I: T he  (Troubled) C onstitu tiona lity  of 
th e  W ar They  Told Us A bout, 42 S ta n . L. Rev. 877 (1990); Ely, Suppose  Congress W anted  A 
W ar Powers Act tha t W orked, 88 C olum . L. Rev. 1379, 1392 (1988).
63 S. Res. 85, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 115 C ong. Rec. 17,245 (1969).
e< S. Rep. No. 129, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 30 (1969).
65 H. K is s in g e r , W h ite  H o u s e  Y e a rs  496 (1979)
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tion. After three years of rigorous debate, Congress submitted the 
War Powers Resolution to President Nixon in 1973 and subsequently 
overrode the President’s veto to sign it into law on November 7, 
1973.66
The intention of the Resolution as stated in section 1541 is “to 
fulfill the intent of the Framers of the Constitution of the United 
States . . . .”67 The plain language of section 1541 ensures that any 
ambiguity in the Resolution itself will be resolved in favor of the 
Constitutional Framers’ intent. In this respect, as noted above, the 
Framers’ intent is clear: The power to declare war is vested in Con­
gress.68 The Framers also made it clear that Congress must authorize 
letters of marque and reprisal, a form of private war, which indicates 
that they intended Congress to authorize all military operations short 
of full scale war as well.69 It is also clear that the Framers’ intended 
that the President remain Commander-in-chief of the army and navy 
once hostilities commenced, and that he have the power to repel sud­
den attacks.70 James Madison pointed out that the power of the 
Commander-in-Chief was to “conduct a war” and did not involve the 
decision of “whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or 
concluded.”71 Any interpretation of the War Powers Resolution must, 
therefore, consider its provisions in light of the initial intent of the 
Framers.
Consistent with the intent of the Framers, the War Powers Resolu­
tion specifically limits the President’s power as Commander-in-Chief 
to introduce U.S. Forces into imminently hostile situations. The Ex­
ecutive interprets the term “imminent hostilities” narrowly to avoid 
triggering the requirement under War Power Resolution. However, 
the House committee report clearly indicates that imminent hostili­
ties include “any state of confrontation in which there is a clear and 
present danger of armed conflict.”72
The President can only “introduce” troops “pursuant to (1) a dec­
laration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national 
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
66 The War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1541-1548 (1990)).
67 50 U.S.C. § 1541.
68 U.S. C on st , a r t .  I, § 8, cl. 11; see supra  n o te s  8-20 a n d  accom pany ing  tex t.
69 Id.\ see also Lobel, Covert W ar and Congressional A u thority: H idden W ar and Forgotten  
Power, 134 U. P a . L. Rev. 1035, 1046, 1060-69 (1986); 3 J. S to ry ,  C o m m e n ta r ie s  o n  t h e  C o n s t i ­
t u t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  § 1170 (1833).
70 2 T h e  R e c o rd s  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  C o n v e n tio n  258, 292, 318-19 (M . Farrand ed. 1911).
71 6 T h e  W r i t in g s  o f  Ja m es M a d iso n  148 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
72 H R. Rep. N o. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
possessions, or its armed forces.”73 In section 2(c) of the Resolution, 
Congress has virtually reiterated the limited Commander-in-Chief 
powers set forth in the Constitution.74
However, section 2(c) of the Resolution goes beyond merely limit­
ing Executive war making. It also requires the President to inform 
Congress and obtain approval for any and all military activity. Sec­
tion 2(c) states: “The President in every possible instance shall con­
sult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces 
into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hos­
tilities is clearly indicated . . . .”75 When troops are deployed the 
President must, within forty-eight hours, formally report the circum­
stances and extent of deployment.76 Section 5(b) of the Resolution 
places a time limit on troop deployment requiring that, “within sixty 
calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submit­
ted . . . the President shall terminate any use of United States 
Armed Forces” unless the Congress has specifically authorized the 
action, extended the sixty day period, or is unable to meet because of 
an attack on the United States.77 The President may extend the sixty 
day period for an additional thirty days to insure the safety of the 
United States Armed Forces during the withdrawal. The sixty/ninety 
day clock begins to run when the President submits the report or is 
required to submit the report under section 4(a)(1).78 If Congress 
takes no action, the terms of the Resolution automatically take effect 
requiring the President to withdraw the troops.79
Section 5(c) of the Resolution gives Congress the power, by concur­
rent resolution, to direct the President to remove troops committed 
to hostilities within the sixty/ninety day period.80 This provision acts 
like a legislative veto, which raises questions as to its constitutional­
ity in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha.81 In 
Chadha, the Court found the use of a legislative veto to be an uncon­
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73 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c).
7< See supra  n o te s 8-20 an d  accom pany ing  tex t.
70 50 U.S.C § 1541(c), 1542.
78 50 U.S.C. 1543(a)(1) (1990). The reports include: (1) why troops were deployed; (2) consti­
tutional or legislative authority relied on in deploying the troops; and (3) the scope and dura­
tion of the deployment. W ar Powers: A Test o f Compliance R elative to the Danang Sea lift, the  
Evacuation of Phnom  Penh, the  Evacuation  o f Saigon, and the  M ayaguez Incident: Hearings 
Before the Subcom m ittee  on In terna tiona l Security  and Scientific  Affairs o f the House Com­
m ittee  on In tern a tio n a l Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1975).
77 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1990).
78 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1990).
79 See  119 C ong. R ec . 33,550 (1973) (S e n a to r Ja v its  d iscusses § 1544).
80 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1990).
81 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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stitutional infringement on the presidential veto power.
Finally, to prevent the President from using the War Powers Reso­
lution as a sixty day delegation of the war power from Congress, the 
Resolution states that “nothing in this joint resolution shall be con­
strued as granting any authority to the President. . . which author­
ity he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.”82
The War Powers Resolution became law in an attempt to restore 
congressional governance over the decision for war or peace. The 
Framers of the Constitution clearly intended for Congress to possess 
the sole power to decide for war, whether declared or undeclared, 
waged in secret or openly acknowledged, fought with the public 
forces of this nation or by private mercenaries. In granting the war 
power solely to Congress, the Framers’ fundamentally accepted the 
notion that to give the President such a power would make him an 
“elective Monarchy,” that the condition of peace—not war—was the 
norm, and that the Congress as the representatives of the people was 
to have the power to preserve the norm, Peace.83 The goal of the War 
Powers Resolution was to return this nation to this peacetime status 
quo.
VI. T h e  P r o b l e m s  w it h  t h e  R e s o l u t io n
The late seventies provided no major test of the functional 
strength of the War Powers Resolution, perhaps due to a prolonged 
period of psychological recovery from the Vietnam experience. How­
ever, this changed with the election of Ronald Reagan. President 
Reagan revitalized the machinery of covert war and provided several 
opportunities for the War Powers Resolution to demonstrate its abil­
ity to check Executive war making in the 1980s.84 The Resolution 
proved unable to meet the President’s challenge.
President Reagan effectively reduced the War Powers Resolution 
to a political bargaining chip during the U.S. Marine deployment in 
Beirut, Lebanon in 1982-83. The President had ordered U.S. troops 
into Beirut in September of 1982, and by September of 1983 the 
Marines were suffering casualties, receiving hostile-fire pay, and car­
82 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d)(2).
83 See  F. W o rm u th  & E. F irm a g e , T o  C h a in  t h e  D o g  o f  W ar: T h e  W a r  P o w e r  o f  C o n g re s s  
in  H is to r y  a n d  L aw  17-18, 30 (2d ed. 1989).
84 Id . at 247-265 (discussing the use of advisors in El Salvador; covert war in Honduras, 
Guatemala, Costa Rica and Nicaragua; military activities in Grenada; and placing U.S. Marines 
in Lebanon); see also Persian G ulf and Congress: A Chronology, 45 C ong. Q. W e e k ly  Rep. 2597 
(1987) (discussing the events of the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf).
rying out helicopter airstrikes.85 Throughout the engagement, the 
President never mentioned the hostilities and never filed a report 
under section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.86 The President 
only agreed to file a War Powers report if Congress agreed to author­
ize continued deployment of forces in Lebanon for up to eighteen 
months.87 Members of Congress were reluctant to condemn the ac­
tions and did not move to invoke the provisions of the War Powers 
Resolution.88 Congress, therefore, gave its de facto approval, and 
eventually a suicide bomber killed 241 Marines.
The Lebanon deployment indicated that provisions of the War 
Powers Resolution would not be voluntarily invoked by the Presi­
dent, and that Congress would have a hard time politically if it tried 
to enforce the provisions. If the President could successfully use com­
pliance with the Resolution as a bargaining chip to manipulate con­
gressional approval, then the War Powers Resolution was already 
functionally powerless. Lebanon also pointed out the difficulty in de­
termining when “hostilities” or “imminent hostilities” are present, 
and what actions would start a running of the sixty/ninety day clock 
if the President failed to file a report under section 4(a)(1). In the 
compromise reached between Congress and President Reagan over 
Lebanon, the “clear indication” of “imminent hostilities” under sec­
tion 4(a)(1) were satisfied when four Marines were killed and 38 
others wounded.89
Further erosion of the War Powers Resolution was soon to follow. 
On October 25, 1983, President Reagan ordered an invasion of the 
tiny island of Grenada and did not inform Congress until the next 
day.90 Troops eventually secured the island on October 28. After the 
Administration guaranteed that troops would be withdrawn within 
sixty days, both houses of Congress failed to invoke the sixty day
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85 See M u ltina tiona l Forces in Lebanon: Hearing before the Sena te  Comm, on Foreign R e­
lations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., (1983).
86 See  President’s Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate, 18 W e e k ly  Comp. P re s .  D oc. 1232 (Sept. 29, 1982); President’s Letter to the Speaker of 
the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 19 W e e k ly  Comp. P re s . D oc. 1186 
(Aug. 30, 1983).
87 Zablocki, The W ar Powers Resolution: I ts  Past Record and Future Promise, 17 Loy. 
L.A.L. Rev. 579, 593-594 (1984).
88 F. W o rm u th  & E. F irm a g e , supra  note 83, at 264-65.
89 Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-119, § 2(b), 97 Stat. 805 (Oct. 
12, 1983).
90 See  President’s Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate, 19 W e e k ly  Comp. P re s .  D oc. 1493 (Oct. 25, 1983); Rubner, The Reagan A d m in is tra ­
tion, the  1973 War Powers Resolution, and the  Invasion  of Grenada, 100 P o l .  Sci. Q. 627 
(1986).
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time clock by concurrent resolution.91
The Grenada invasion pointed out a second problem with the func­
tioning of the War Powers Resolution. Despite the specific language 
in the Resolution stating that it does not delegate any power to the 
President beyond that already granted by the Constitution,92 the 
Resolution served as a grant of “quick” war power to the President. 
The willingness of Congress to ignore the War Powers Resolution in 
situations where Executive war making is immediately successful, 
such as in Grenada, amounts to a concession of sixty day war power 
to the President. This is clearly an unconstitutional delegation of 
congressional war power to the President.
The Gulf of Sidra incident of 1986 exposed a third problem with 
the War Powers Resolution. Libya’s Colonel Qadhafi had earlier de­
clared a “line of death” across the Gulf of Sidra and threatened to 
attack any foreign military forces crossing this line. In March of 1986, 
the United States challenged Qadhafi with 375 sorties across “the 
line” and the positioning of a naval task force inside the Gulf of Si­
dra. As expected, Qadhafi opened fire on U.S. naval forces and the 
U.S. responded by destroying Libyan land and naval targets.93
The same day hostilities began, March 24, 1986, the Chairman of 
the House Subcommittee on Foreign Relations urged President Rea­
gan to comply with the War Powers Resolution. The President re­
sponded by declaring that hostilities were not “imminent” in this sit­
uation.94 This exchange between President Reagan and Chairman 
Fascell illustrates the executive branch’s ability to dodge Resolution 
compliance by manipulating the term “imminent hostilities.” In fact, 
throughout the history of the War Powers Resolution, the President 
has never been forced to adhere to a congressional determination of 
“imminent hostilities.”96
The Reagan administration also considered the reflagging and es­
cort of Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf as a situation where 
United States forces were not subject to “hostilities or imminent hos­
81 See generally  Quigley, The U nited  S ta te s  Invasion o f Grenada: S tranger T han  Fiction,
18 U. M iam i In te r -A m e r . L. Rev. 271 (1986).
82 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d)(2).
83 See H earings Before the  Subcom m . on A rm s Control, In terna tiona l security  and Science  
of the  House Comm, on Foreign A ffairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, War Powers, Libya, and State- 
Sponsored Terrorism (Comm. Print 1986) (Libya Hearings).
84 See  Letter from W. Ball (Assistant to President Reagan) to Chairman Fascell (March 26, 
1986), reprin ted  in  Libya Hearings, supra  note 93, at 209.
85 See generally  Comment, A  Tug of War: The War Powers R esolution and the M eaning of
“H o stilitie s”, 15 P ac. L.J. 265 (1984) (asserting that a broad definition of hostilities would pre­
vent Executive preemption of War Powers Resolution).
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tilities,” despite the fact that (1) an Iraqi attack jet fired two Exocet 
missiles at the USS Stark  assigned to the Gulf killing thirty-seven 
navy crewmen;96 (2) a U.S. fighter plane fired two missiles at a poten­
tially threatening Iranian aircraft;97 (3) American helicopters fired 
and destroyed mine-laying Iranian aircraft in self-defense;98 (4) three 
U.S. helicopters fired on four Iranian patrol boats after the boats 
fired on a helicopter;99 (5) an Iranian Silkworm missile hit a reflagged 
tanker off the Kuwaiti coast and American destroyers retaliated by 
attacking two Iranian off-shore oil platforms;100 (6) an Iranian mine 
struck an American frigate and the U.S. attacked two more oil plat­
forms;101 and (7) the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian airbus 
thought to be an F-14 fighter, killing 290 civilians.102 Although the 
President consulted with congress before conducting military retalia­
tions, he consistently stated that the troops escorting the tankers 
were not subject to “hostilities or imminent hostilities.”103
President Bush has also manipulated the “imminent hostilities” 
language to avoid the War Powers Resolution. In May, 1989, Presi­
dent Bush responded to a rapidly escalating situation in Panama by 
sending 2,000 combat ready troops into the canal zone. Although this 
certainly qualified as an introduction of U.S. troops into an immi­
nently hostile situation from an objective viewpoint, he did not com­
ply with the War Powers Resolution at that time. The subsequent 
invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989, demonstrated the contin­
ued use of the War Powers Resolution as a delegation of “quick” war 
power to the Executive. The Panama invasion, like the Grenada inva­
sion, was accomplished quickly, and as with Grenada, Congress did 
not invoke the War Powers Resolution.104
While these military events of the 1980s point out the shortcom­
ings of the War Powers Resolution in its present form, the most glar­
ing example of the failure of the Resolution has been the 1990-91 
U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf. After Iraq invaded
“6 Wash. Post, May 18, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
“7 Wash. Post, Aug. 11, 1987, at A l, col. 6.
“  U.S. Takes D efensive A ction  in the  Persian Gulf, D e p ’t  St . B ull., Nov. 1987, at 43-44.
BB Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1987, at A l, col. 4.
100 P ersian G u lf and  Congress: A Chronology, 45 C ong . Q. W eekly  R e p . 2597 (1987). 
President Reagan’s Letter to the Congress, April 19, 1988, reprin ted  in  D e p ’t  S t . B ull.,
June 1988, at 36.
101 N.Y. Times, July 4, 1988, at A4, col. 1.
103 For a detailed examination of the Persian Gulf Reflagging operation see Comment, The
W ar Powers R esolution  and  the  Persian Gulf: A Controversial S ta tu te  Proves U nw orkable , 8 
Wis. I n t ’l  L.J. 453, 464-485 (1990).
See  Rosenthal, U.S. Forces Gain W ide Control in  Panam a, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, § 
A, at 1, col. 1.
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Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President Bush unilaterally ordered a 
massive mobilization of combat ready troops and equipment to the 
Kuwaiti border.105 This massive insertion of troops into the Saudi- 
Kuwaiti frontier, code-named Operation Desert Shield, should have 
triggered several components of the War Powers Resolution. First, 
the President should have been forced to report to Congress in accor­
dance with the War Powers Resolution prior to sending troops or 
immediately afterwards. Second, the sixty day clock of the Resolu­
tion should have been automatically  triggered. Third, once sixty days 
had elapsed Congress should have assumed control of the decision to 
continue massing for an offensive or to maintain a purely defensive 
force in the Gulf. However, the War Powers Resolution was again not 
functioning in the Gulf. Apparently, the credibility of the Resolution 
has been destroyed with the excesses of the past ten years. The inci­
dents leading up to the war in the Gulf point out the need to revise 
the War Power Resolution to save it from presidential disregard and 
congressional indifference.
VII. C h a n g e s  in  t h e  W a r  P o w e r s  A c t
Ideally, the legislative and executive branches should confer, con­
sult and decide for war under the foreign relations powers given both 
political branches by the Framers. Under such circumstances, there 
would be no need for a War Powers Resolution. However, history and 
experience repudiate this ideal.106 Indeed, some commentators and 
politicians doubt that the enormous power that has inured to the 
President over the past decades can be curtailed in any way short of 
a constitutional amendment.107
1011 Gordon, Iraq A rm y Invades Capital of K uw ait in  Fierce Fighting, New York Times, Aug.
2, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 6; E xcerp ts From B u sh ’s Rem arks on His Order to Enlarge U.S. G ulf 
Force, New York Times, Nov. 8, 1990, § A, at 12, col. 1; Gordon, B ush Sends New  U nits to 
G ulf to Provide ‘offensive o p t io n U .S .  Force Could Reach 380,000, New York Times, Nov. 9, 
1990, § A, at 1, col. 6.
106 One commentator counted 199 military engagements that have occurred without a decla­
ration of war. See  Emerson, W ar Powers Legislation, 74 W. Va. L. Rev. 53, 88-110 (1971); 
Emerson, W ar Powers Legislation, 74 W. Va. L. Rev., at 367-68 (1972); see also House Comm­
on Foreign Aff., B ackground In form ation  on the  Use of U nited  S ta te s  A rm ed Forces in For­
eign C ountries, H R. Doc. No. 16, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 50-57 (1970). For categorization of these 
undeclared wars, see E. K ey n es , U n d e c la r e d  W a r  91 (1982); F. W o rm u th  & E. F irm a g e , supra  
note 83, at 125-63.
107 See, e.g.. Comment, A B icen tennia l View of the  Role of the  Congress, the  President, and  
the  Ju d ic iary  in Regard to the  Power Over War, 7 P a c e  L. Rev. 695, 751-55 (1987) (proposing 
amendment to Commander-in-Chief clause “subject to any and all reasonable restrictions 
which may be imposed by Congress”); Goldstein, The Failure of C onstitu tional Controls Over 
W ar Powers in the  N uclear Age: The A rgum ent for a C onstitu tional A m endm en t, 40 S ta n . L. 
R ev. 1543 (1988).
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A more realistic solution to the problem is to overhaul the War 
Powers Resolution of 1973. The experiences of the past decade have 
revealed that the President will use whatever means are at his dispo­
sal to circumvent the intent and purpose of the War Powers Resolu­
tion.108 Many legal academicians and commentators agree that the 
War Powers Resolution, while correct in its viewpoint, needs signifi­
cant strengthening to solidify congressional control over the use of 
our armed forces.109 This preponderance of opinion seems to be based 
on two concepts: (1) the War Powers Resolution reflects the correct 
constitutional posture on congressional control of the military;110 and 
(2) the War Powers Resolution, while having some deterrent effect on 
the executive branch, has been ignored all too often by presidents, 
and requires substantial revision to empower the Act.111 In order to 
curb such circumvention, Congress should identify the weaknesses in
The Goldstein proposition is as follows:
Congress shall be required to supervise and oversee military planning, capabilities, 
and readiness. Congress, as part of its ordinary legislative powers and its extraordi­
nary power to declare war, shall have absolute authority to govern, control, and direct 
all aspects of the structure and functioning of the armed forces. This power includes 
the right to issue orders to the Commander in Chief, as well as subordinate civilian 
and military authorities.
This power shall be delegable in whatever way Congress sees fit including, but not 
limited to, congressional committees and subcommittees, the Executive department, 
or to technical systems.
The failure of Congress to provide adequate oversight to war-planning shall be a 
justiciable cause of action against Congress as a whole. If the court hearing such a 
complaint finds that Congress has not adequately discharged its responsibility to con­
sider fully all the requisite factors related to military planning, capabilities, and read­
iness, the court may grant an injunction directing Congress to consider the particular 
factors at issue and to come to a rationally based plan. No substantive outcome m ay  
be ordered by the court. The court’s final order shall be appealable through normal 
judicial channels.
Goldstein, supra, at 1587.
108 See  T o rrice lli, The W ar Powers R esolu tion  A fte r  the Libya Crisis, 7 P ace L. R ev. 661, 
672 (1987); H ig h sm ith , Policing E xecu tive  A dventurism : Congressional Oversight o f M ilitary  
and  P aram ilitary O perations, 19 H arv. J . L eg is . 327, 342 (1982).
109 See, e.g., W. R e v e le y , III, W a r  P o w e r s  o f  t h e  P r e s id e n t  a n d  C o n g re s s  (1981); Vance, 
S trik in g  th e  Balance: Congress and  th e  P resident U nder the  W ar Powers Resolution, 133 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 79 (1984); Note, The F uture  o f the  W ar Powers R esolution, 36 S ta n . L. Rev. 1407, 
1410 (1984); Glennon, The W ar Powers Resolution: Sad  Record, D ism al Promise, 17 Loy. 
L.A.L. Rev. 657, 667 (1984); Ely, Suppose  Congress W anted  a W ar Powers A ct tha t W orked, 88 
C olum . L. Rev. 1379, 1392 (1988). Comment, supra  note 103, at 464-485; contra R. T u r n e r ,  T h e  
W a r  P o w e r s  R e s o lu t io n :  I t s  Im p le m e n ta tio n  in T h e o ry  a n d  P r a c t i c e  107-33 (1983).
110 See supra  notes 8-19 and accompanying text; see generally  Zablocki, T he W ar Powers 
Resolution: I ts  Past Record and F uture  Promise, 17 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 579, 597 (1984); Note, A 
D efense o f the  W ar Powers R esolution, 93 Y a le  L.J. 1330 (1984); Buchanan, In  Defense o f the  
W ar Powers Resolution: Chadha Does N o t A p p ly , 22 Hous. L. Rev. 1155 (1985).
111 Vance, supra  note 109, at 91-95; see generally  Sym posium : W ar Powers R esolution, 17 
L oy. L.A.L. R ev. 579-802 (1984).
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the present Resolution, and amend the Act to cure them.
First, the requirements under the consultation clause in section 
3112 of the Resolution need to be clearly defined.113 The purpose of 
the consultation clause is to promote collective decision-making. The 
term “consult” must be defined as a genuine collaborative decision­
making process between the executive branch and the Congress 
before deploying troops or committing to deploy troops occurs.114 
One proposal would amend the War Powers Resolution to require the 
Executive to discuss fully and “seek the advice and counsel of Con­
gress.”116 Whatever the change in the definition of the term “con­
sult,” it must clearly state that consultation requires genuine discus­
sion with Congress to avoid the current practice where the Executive 
merely informs Congress of what has happened or is about to 
happen.116
Section 3 should also specify the exact group to be consulted. 
Clearly, consultation cannot practically involve the entire congress. 
When the President has bothered to consult “the Congress” in the 
past, he has generally selected various leaders from both houses of 
Congress. Clearly defining who is to be consulted will promote a bet­
ter understanding of the congressional role in the governance of the 
armed forces and the decision for war. A bill introduced by Senator
1.2 Section 3 of the Resolution states:
The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introduc­
ing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent 
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every 
such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States 
Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such 
situations.
50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1990).
1.3 See, e.g., Vance, supra  note 109; Highsmith, supra  note 108, at 343.
111 The events leading up to the Gulf War demonstrate that a commitment by the President
to defend another country (Saudi Arabia) can lead to a de facto state of war.
115 This phraseology was originally suggested by Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.), S. 1790,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 121 C ong. R ec. S. 15,580 (May 21, 1975); see also N.Y. Times, May
22, 1975, at 1, col. 2 (discussing the lack of support for Senator Eagleton’s amendment).
116 The House Foreign Affairs Committee originally addressed the proper definition of con­
su lt under the Resolution:
Rejected was the notion that consultation should be synonymous with merely being 
informed. Rather, consultation in this provision means that a decision is pending on a 
problem and that Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their 
advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of action con­
templated. Furthermore, for consultation to be meaningful, the President himself 
must participate and all information relevant to the situation must be made 
available.
H.R. Rep. N o. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, reprin ted  in  U.S. C o d e  C ong. & Admin. N ew s 2351 
(1973).
Robert Byrd when he was Senate Majority Leader, specifies consulta­
tion with (1) a small group consisting of the Speaker of the House, 
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and the majority and mi­
nority leaders of both houses; and (2) a larger “permanent consulta­
tive group” consisting of the members of the small group plus twelve 
other congressional VIPs.117 Others have suggested the President re­
port to specially designed subgroups of Congress similar to those out­
lined in Senator Byrd’s proposal.118 Either definition would help clar­
ify Congress’ role in the consultation process.
The provisions of Section 3 identifying when the President should 
consult congress must also be clarified. Section 3 of the War Powers 
Resolution requires the President to consult with Congress “in every 
possible instance” before deploying troops.119 The vagaries implicit in 
the phrase, “in every possible instance” needs to be removed to give 
the executive branch some specific guidance regarding its responsibil­
ity to consult. Presidents have generally failed to consult Congress 
before ordering military action abroad.120 Currently, the executive 
branch decides what “in every possible instance” means and decides 
who should be consulted, and how far in advance. This results in lim­
ited or no consultation between Congress and the executive branch 
before forces are deployed. Therefore, to improve presidential com­
pliance with the consultation requirements, and to prevent a useless 
debate on what the term “in every possible instance” means, which 
would signal weakness and inaction to potential adversaries, this 
term should be removed.
Another solution to the “in every possible instance” wording is to
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117 See  S.J. Res. 323, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1988); See, e.g., 134 C ong. R ec. S7167, S7169 
(daily ed. June 6, 1988) (Senators Warner and McCain).
118 See  Glennon, The W ar Powers R esolution Ten  Years Later: More Politics Th a n  Law, 78 
Am. J. I n t ’l  L. 571, 581 (1984); Banks, First Use o f N uclear Weapons: The C onstitu tional 
Leadersh ip  C om m ittee, 13 J. L eg is. 1 (1986) (in the event of a first use of nuclear weapons 
subgroups of congress should be consulted); Vance, supra  note 109, at 92.
Vance would require consultation with the Majority and Minority Leaders of both houses, 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Chairpersons and ranking minority mem­
bers of the Armed Forces and Foreign Affairs Committees of both houses. Vance, supra note 
109, at 92.
The Federation of American Scientists (“FAS”) proposal would require a majority vote of a 
special committee to authorize presidential first use of nuclear weapons. The committee would 
be composed of the Speaker of the House, Majority and Minority Leaders of the House, the 
president pro-tempore, Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate, and the Chair and rank­
ing member of each of the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, the Senate Com­
mittee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on International Relations. Banks, 
supra, at 3.
1,9 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1990).
120 See  Vance, supra  note 109, at 90.
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extend the consultation clause to cover all situations where the Presi­
dent is presently required to report under section 4(a)(1).121 In es­
sence, every event that is important enough to require a report under 
the War Powers Act should also require a consultation with the Con­
gress or other appropriate sub-group. Such a change would prevent 
the President from ignoring the consultation provision when required 
to report under section 4(a)(1).122 It would also assure consultation 
before the reportable event occurs, and will, therefore, promote fuller 
legislative understanding of the deployment, and greater control over 
presidential military or paramilitary activities. Each of these revi­
sions to the consultation clause will clarify both the executive and 
congressional roles under the Resolution. Regardless of how it is ac­
complished, the consultation clause must be narrowly defined so that 
Congress once again shares in the decision process when this nation 
goes to war.
Second, the “imminent hostilities” portion of section 4(a)(1) of the 
War Power Resolution is far too ambiguous and must be amended or 
repealed. Section 4(a)123 of the Resolution requires the President to 
report to Congress within forty-eight hours of introducing armed 
forces “into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement 
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances” and in certain 
other situations. By using his own definition of the term hostilities, a 
president may avoid the reporting requirement, and evade the entire 
premise of the War Powers Resolution.124 Although the House report
121 Id. at 92.
122 See  Highsmith, supra  note 108, at 345; Glennon, Stren g th en in g  the  W ar Powers R esolu­
tion: The Case for P urse-Strings R estrictions, 60 M inn. L. Rev. 1, 36 (1975).
123 Section 4(a) of the Resolution provides:
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which the United States Armed 
Forces are introduced—
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for 
combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or 
training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped 
for combat already located in a foreign nation;
The President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Repre­
sentatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting 
forth—
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed 
Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took 
place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
124 See  Note, The W ar Powers Resolution: A Tool for Balancing Power Through N egotia-
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on the war powers bill originally imparted broad meanings to the 
terms hostilities and imminent hostilities ,128 the executive branch 
traditionally interprets those terms narrowly.126 The section is made 
even more ambiguous by the requirement that the imminent involve­
ment in hostilities be “clearly indicated by the circumstances.”127 
These undefined terms make it difficult to challenge the President’s 
interpretation of when hostilities are present or imminent in a given 
situation. Under the current Resolution, the President can ignore the 
reporting requirement under section 4(a)(1) and never trigger either 
the sixty day period or the reporting requirements by claiming that 
hostilities were not present, imminent or clearly indicated by the cir­
cumstances.128 A broader definition should be adopted requiring con­
sultation before and reporting after the introducing forces into any 
situation where there is armed conflict. A broader framework would 
require the President to report any time armed conflict exists.
Section 4(a)(1) should also be amended to require the President to 
specify which provision of the Resolution is being invoked when it 
reports to congress. Because of the sixty/ninety day deployment limi­
tion, 70 V a. L. R ev . 1037, 1049, 1052 (1984).
125 The Report stated:
The word hostilities  was substituted for the phrase arm ed conflict during the sub­
committee drafting process because it was considered to be somewhat broader in 
scope. In addition to a situation in which fighting actually has begun, hostilities  also 
encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where 
there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict. Im m in en t hostilities  denotes a 
situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of confrontation or 
for actual armed conflict.
H R. Rep. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1973).
126 See, e.g., Comment, A Tug o f War: The War Powers R esolution and the  M eaning of 
"H ostilities”, 15 P ac . L.J. 265, 266 (1984); see generally  Note, The War Powers Resolution: An  
A ct Facing “Im m in en t H o s tilitie s” a Decade Later, 16 V and. J. T r a n s n a t ’l  L. 915 (1983).
127 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (1990).
128 After Iraq’s August 2nd invasion of Kuwait, on August 10, 1990, President Bush reported 
to Congress under the War Powers Resolution but the sixty/ninety day clock was not triggered 
because he asserted that he did not “believe that involvement in hostilities is imminent.” Ap­
ple, U.S. Says I ts  Troops in the  G ulf Could Reach 100,000 in M onths, New York Times, Au­
gust 11, 1990, §1, at 1, col. 4.; Gordon, Iraq A rm y Invades Capital o f K uw ait in Fierce F igh t­
ing, New York Times, Aug. 2, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 6. It should be noted, however, that at the 
time there was a genuine fear that Saudi Arabia would be attacked and President Bush even 
made the statement on September 16, that the U.S. and Iraq were “on the brink of war.” 
Rosenthal, Bush Tells Iraqis Leaders P ut T hem  On ‘B rink O f War', New York Times, Sept. 
17, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 6; T ext o f B u sh ’s Television M essage to Iraqi People, New York Times, 
Sept. 17, 1990, § A, at 10, col. 3. Further, when Bush announced the deployment of additional 
troops on November 8, to give the U.S. an offensive option, the “imminent hostilities” reporting 
requirement was clearly applicable but was never complied with by the President. E xcerpts  
From B u sh ’s Rem arks on H is Order to Enlarge U.S. G u lf Force, New York Times, Nov. 8, 
1990, § A, at 12, col. 1; Gordon, Bush Sends N ew  U nits to G ulf to Provide ‘Offensive Option': 
U.S. Force Could Reach 380,000, New York Times, Nov. 9, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 6.
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tations, and the automatic withdrawal requirement of section 5(b) 
and (c), presidents have been reluctant to report under section 
4(a)(1) for fear of starting the sixty/ninety day period. Presidential 
administrations have generally complied with the reporting provi­
sions of the Resolution while stating that the reports were not made 
under section 4(a)(1) of the Resolution.129 Requiring the President to 
state under which section of the resolution he is reporting, will put 
pressure on the President to comply with the resolution and start the 
sixty/ninety day clock. These problems would be solved by a clarified 
definition of what constitutes “hostilities or imminent hostilities” 
and a better method for invoking the provision if the President fails 
to report under section 4(a)(1).
Third, the three situations when the President can introduce 
armed forces into hostilities under section 2(c) are too limited. Com­
mentators agree that the list is too inflexible and should have in­
cluded a provision justifying the introduction of troops into hostili­
ties to protect American citizens.130 Moreover, the limitations are too 
difficult to enforce, and they deprive the President of the flexibility 
necessary to conduct foreign policy. Complete specification of all pos­
sible instances where the President may introduce troops is an im­
possible task.131 Both Congress and the Reagan Administration have 
previously indicated that eliminating the enumerations under section 
2(c) would improve compliance with the War Powers Resolution.132
129 The President reported to congress but specifically did not invoke section 4(a)(1) in Leba­
non, Grenada, Libya and the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf. In connection 
with the Lebanon troop deployment Congress challenged the Reagan Administration and even­
tually compromised on an eighteen month deployment. See  Ides, Congress, C onstitu tional R e­
sponsib ility  and the War Power, 17 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 599, 642-52 (1984). In the Persian gulf 
reflagging effort, the Reagan Administration repeatedly escaped the section 4(a)(1) reporting 
provisions by indicating that hostilities were not imminent. See  Comment, The War Powers 
R esolution  and the  Persian Gulf: A Controversial S ta tu te  Proves Unworkable, 8 Wis. I n t ’l  L.J. 
453, 496-97 (1990).
130 Glennon, The War Powers Resolution: Sad  Record, D ism al Promise, 17 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 
657, 662 (1984); Ely, Suppose  Congress W anted a War Powers A ct th a t W orked, 88 C olum . L. 
R ev. 1379, 1393 (1988).
131 Professor Ely suggests a list of situations where the President would appear to have con­
stitutional authority to use the Armed Forces including:
to rescue American citizens abroad, to rescue foreign nationals where such action di­
rectly facilitates the rescue of U.S. citizens abroad, to protect U.S. Embassies and 
Legations abroad, to suppress civil insurrection, to implement and administer the 
terms of an armistice or cease-fire designed to terminate hostilities involving the 
United States, and to carry out the terms of security commitments contained in 
treaties.”
See  Ely, The A m erican W ar in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled) C o nstitu tiona lity  o f the  
W ar They  Told Us A bout, 42 S ta n . L. Rev. 887, 930 (1990).
132 See  Soafer, The War Powers Resolution (September 15, 1988) (statement before the Sen­
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Fourth, section 5(c) of the Resolution should be repealed. Section 
5(c) provides that Congress can direct the President to remove troops 
from hostilities within the sixty-day period by concurrent resolution. 
This provision is arguably subject to the proscriptions on legislative 
veto outlined in IN S v. Chadha.133 While the provision in the War 
Powers Resolution may be theoretically distinguishable from the leg­
islative veto in Chadha, section 5(c) would likely be held unconstitu­
tional if it were challenged. Both Justices Powell and White indicate 
that Chadha invalidates all legislative veto provisions,134 and Justice 
White specifically referred to section 5(c) as an unconstitutional veto 
power.136 Although many scholars believe that the War Powers Reso­
lution survives the Chadha test,136 prudence dictates that the legisla­
tive veto provision be made clearly severable from the rest of the 
Resolution, or that an alternative mechanism be devised to trigger 
congressional action.137 Another alternative is to negotiate a binding 
agreement between the Congress and the Executive providing for the 
advise and consent of Congress before any troops are committed to 
hostilities. Because of these problems with section 5(c), and because 
it appears likely that Congress will never try to enforce the 
mandatory withdrawal provisions, both the Congress and the Reagan 
Administration have suggested that section 5(c) be removed from the
ate Foreign Relations Committee), p rin ted  in D ep’t  S t .  B u l l . ,  N ov. 1988, at 38; S.J. R es. 323, 
100th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 2 (1988).
133 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The rationale for the proscription on a legislative veto found in the 
United States Constitution which provides at article I, § 7, cl. 3:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House 
of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be 
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Ef­
fect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two 
thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limi­
tations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959, 974.
,3“ Id. at 970-71.
I3a See generally  Note, The War Powers Resolution: Congress Seeks to Reassert I ts  C onsti­
tu tio n a l Role as a P artner in  War M aking, 18 R u tg e r s  L.J. 405 (1987); Banks, supra  note 118, 
at 11-20; Carter, The C o n stitu tio n a lity  o f the  War Powers R esolution, 70 Va. L. Rev. 101 
(1984); Comment, Congressional Control o f Presidentia l W ar-M aking U nder the  War Powers 
Act: The S ta tu s  o f the  Legislative Veto A fte r  Chadha, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1217, 1237-40 (1984); 
contra  Comment, A p p ly in g  Chadha: The F ate of the War Powers Resolution, 24 S a n ta  C la r a  
L. Rev. 697, 733 (1984); Ely, supra  note 130, at 1395.
137 One suggestion would amend the War Powers Resolution “to require Congress to pass a 
resolution declaring presidential compliance with the War Power Resolution whenever troops 
are deployed by a president onto foreign soil.” Note, The War Powers Resolution: A fte r  a 
Decade of Presidentia l Avoidance Congress A tte m p ts  to Reassert I ts  A u th o rity , 8 S u f f o lk  
T r a n s n a t ’l  L.J. 75, 108 (1984).
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resolution.138
Another problem related to the legislative veto provision of section 
5(c), is the mandatory troop withdrawal provision under section 5(b). 
Section 5(b) provides that “the President shall terminate” the use of 
armed forces if the sixty day period runs without any action by Con­
gress.138 Congress can regain control over the war making power by 
passing an amendment to section 5(b) providing for funds to be with­
held from unauthorized presidential use after the sixty day period 
has lapsed.140 Congress has always wielded the power of the purse- 
strings and that power is unquestionably an exclusive power of Con­
gress.141 Absent compliance with the consultation and reporting re­
quirements under the War Powers Resolution, funding should be 
subject to immediate cut-off by congressional resolution.142
Sixth, Congress needs to address the use of covert paramilitary op­
erations and the war power.143 The proliferation of covert war carried 
out under the guise of intelligence-gathering operations or through 
“private” enterprises suggests that certain paramilitary operations 
should be covered under any refurbished war powers resolution.144 As 
Newell Highsmith suggested in a 1982 article:
A reformation of the WPR in light of Title V would also place
138 See  Soafer, The War Powers Resolution (September 15, 1988) (statement before the Sen­
ate Foreign Relations Committee), p rin ted  in  D ep ’t  St. B u l l . ,  Nov. 1988, at 38; S.J. Res. 323, 
100th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 4 (1988).
138 Section 5(b) does not necessarily fall under the prohibitions of Chadha. Professor Ely 
notes that the Chadha  Court expressly stated that “other means of control, such as durational 
limits on authorizations and formal reporting requirements, lie well within Congress’ constitu­
tional power.” C hadha, 462 U.S. at 955 n.19. Professor Carter has pointed out that section 5(b) 
is a not a legislative veto, but a “sunset law.” Under this view, section 5(b) is the functional 
equivalent of a statute providing that troops simply may not be committed to combat for more 
than 60 days. Carter, supra  note 136, at 133.
M0 Glennon, supra  note 122, at 23-28.
141 Id . at 32-33; U.S. C o n s t, art. I, § 8, cl. 1.; see also Glennon, supra  note 122, at 37.
142 Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State during the Carter Administration, recommended 
an amendment to the War Powers Resolution providing, “notwithstanding any other law, no 
funds made available under any law may be obligated or expended for any use of United States 
forces prohibited by section 5(b) of the Resolution or by concurrent resolution of Congress 
under section 5(c) thereof.” Vance, supra  note 109, at 93-94; see also S. 1906, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 129 C onc . R ec. S.13,245 (1983).
143 For an excellent discussion of the need for congressional control over covert war and 
paramilitary operations, see Lobel, Covert W ar and  Congressional A uthority: H idden War and  
Forgotten Power, 134 U. P a. L. Rev. 1035 (1986).
144 Glennon, supra  note 118, at 581. One of the original sponsors of the War Powers Resolu­
tion, Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.), suggested that covert intelligence operations should be 
under the same standard as other military operations. 119 C ong. R ec. S25,079-80 (1973) (daily 
ed. July 20, 1973) (statement of Senator Eagleton). See also Highsmith, supra  note 108, at 368­
76 (discussing the “paramilitary loophole” in the War Powers Resolution and other statutes).
paramilitary operations under the same standards as military opera­
tions. The committees specified in the WPR and Intelligence Com­
mittees would consult with the Executive Branch whenever possible 
before an operation and screen out operations that amounted to 
war. Operations of this type would be referred to the full Congress 
for expedited consideration and action. A declaration of war or spe­
cific statutory authorization would be required.148
Seventh, the possibility of nuclear warfare or nuclear conflicts 
should not force Congress from its constitutional role as sole decider 
for war and peace.146 The eighteenth century framers of our Constitu­
tion considered war to be so terrible that peace was to be the norm, 
the status quo. Anyone who presumed to move us from a status quo 
of peace to war had the burden of first persuading the Nation. Noth­
ing in the nature of nuclear weapons makes war more inviting. On 
the contrary, the utter devastation that would follow detonation of 
even a small portion of our nuclear stockpile, weighs heavily in favor 
of congressional approval before any use of nuclear weapons.147 
Clearly, first strike nuclear capability should be subject to congres­
sional control.
Finally, Congress should amend the War Powers Resolution to 
make its provisions judicially enforceable by allowing adjudication 
for violations in a court of law. The amendment should create stand­
ing for congressional plaintiffs, clearly indicate that presidential non­
compliance is sufficient to make the question ripe for review, and 
state that the political question doctrine, to the extent not mandated 
by the Constitution, may not be used as a grounds for dismissal.148 
“ Whether we go to war is a political question to be decided by Con­
gress, absent sudden attack. The way  we go to war is not. It has been
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145 Id. at 379 (citation omitted).
146 Banks, supra  note 118.
H7 Physicians are becoming increasing concerned about the devastating effects of nuclear 
war. The seminal, and still key, research in this area of the medical consequences, of nuclear 
war is Ervin, H um an and Ecological E ffects in Mass. o f an A ssum ed  Therm onuclear War, 226 
New Eng. J. Med. 1126, 1127-37 (1962); see also Hiatt, The F inal Epidem ic: Prescriptions for 
P revention , 252 J. A.M.A. 635, 635-44 (1984). Long-term consequences of nuclear war, or “nu­
clear winter,” are discussed in Sagan, N uclear W inter: Global Consequences o f M u ltip le  N u ­
clear Explosions, 222 Sci. 128 (1983); Ehrlich, Long-Term  Biological Consequences o f N uclear 
War, 222 Sci. 1293 (1983).
148 See generally  Firmage, The  War Powers and the  Political Question Doctrine, 49 U. C o lo . 
L. Rev. 65 (1977); F. W o rm u th  & E. F irm ag e , To C h a in  t h e  D og  o f  W ar: T h e  W a r  P o w e r  o f  
C o n g re s s  in  H is to r y  a n d  Law  225-52 (ch. 15) (2d ed. 1989); Glennon, supra  note 118, at 580; 
Glennon, The G ulf W ar and the  C onstitu tion , F o re ig n  A ff., Spring 1991, at 84; cf. Goldstein, 
supra  note 107, at 1587 (proposing constitutional amendment allowing justiciability and stand­
ing for inadequate congressional oversight).
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carefully prescribed by the Constitution. Currently, courts avoid ad­
judicating war powers controversies by referring to the political ques­
tion doctrine.149 Plaintiffs who are members of Congress may be pre­
vented from bringing suit because they lack sufficient “standing.”150 
Courts are also reluctant to enforce the War Powers Resolution with­
out a vote from a majority of Congress in each case, thus forcing Con­
gress to run a political gauntlet every time a crisis occurs.151 Congress 
can rectify this situation by clearly granting the courts jurisdiction to 
hear war power disputes and granting congressional plaintiffs stand­
ing to sue for relief. Allowing courts to adjudicate disputes over viola­
tions will also promote presidential compliance with the statute.
VIII. C o n c l u s io n
The temptation to resort to war and to covert action has remained 
with us, despite an end to the “communist threat” that motivated so 
much war power abuse in the past. However, our forty-five year 
“habit” with overt and covert warfare must not be allowed to distort 
and destroy our natural inclination toward peace and our constitu­
tional commitment of the war power to Congress. A new era is at 
hand, and the United States has an opportunity to set a course not 
only for itself, but also for the nations of the world towards the mu­
tually desirable state of open government and world peace. The end 
we seek, the enjoyment of peace and liberty, must be congruent with 
the means we select to ensure our liberty and our peace.
The lessons of history prove that the United States gains nothing 
and loses much when it hastily goes to war with other nations. By 
strengthening the War Powers Resolution to more closely resemble 
Constitutional War Power, Congress can ensure that the United 
States will not be haunted by the excesses of the last forty-five years 
as it enters the twenty-first century. As the United States attempts 
to lead all nations into a “New World Order,” it must first demon­
strate that it is able to comply with its own constitutional rules.
M9 See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1983), a ff’g  558 F. Supp. 893 
(D.D.C. 1982); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (seminal case on nonjusticiability of politi­
cal questions).
,ao See Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1357 (Bork, J., concurring); but see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 500-01 (1979) (Congress may statutorily confer standing).
m Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D.D.C. 1987) (noting that a judicial decision on 
either side of an issue where members of Congress were divided “necessarily would contradict 
legislative pronouncements on one side or the other.”); Dellums v. Bush, No. 90-2866 (D.C.C. 
filed Nov. 20, 1990) (where 56 members of Congress sought to restrain President Bush from 
going to war with Iraq without prior congressional consent the court found the case was not 
ripe for review until a majority of Congress seeks judicial “relief from an infringement on its 
constitutional war-declaration power.”).
